

## PHILOPONUS, *IN DE ANIMA* III: QUEST FOR AN AUTHOR\*

It has been strongly disputed that Philoponus is the author of the commentary on the third book of *De Anima* printed in vol. xv of *CAG* under his name, and Stephanus of Alexandria has been taken to be its real author. The evidence for the authorship of Stephanus is as follows: (I) *Codex Parisinus gr.* 1914, written in the twelfth century, has an adscript by a later hand saying βιβλίον τρίτον ἀπὸ φωνῆς στεφάνου ('third book from the voice of Stephanus'), and the same appears in the fifteenth-century *Codex Estensis* iii F 8. (II) In 543.9 there is a clause saying ὡς ἐν τῷ Περὶ ἐρμηνείας ἐμάθομεν ('as we learnt in the *De Interpretatione*'), which was taken by M. Hayduck to be direct reference to Stephanus' commentary on the *De Interpretatione*, edited also by Hayduck in vol. xiii/3 of *CAG*. (III) The third book, says Hayduck, is short (*brevis*) and jejune (*jejunos*), in contrast to the verbosity of the preceding two books. (IV) The commentary on the third book of *De Anima* is divided into lectures (*πράξεις*), but the first two books are not. (V) Some locutions are used constantly in the third book and in Stephanus' *in De Interpretatione* as well. (VI) In the *Codex Vaticanus gr.* 241 fol. 6 (fourteenth century) we are told that Stephanus also wrote a commentary on the *De Anima*.<sup>1</sup>

All these points were collected by Hayduck in his prefaces to his editions of this *in De Anima*<sup>2</sup> and of Stephanus' *in De Interpretatione*. (VII) In addition to that, we have the Latin text of a part of a commentary on the third book of *De Anima* (on chs. 4–8), which is called *De Intellectu*, translated into Latin from the lost Greek original by William of Moerbeke and attributed to Philoponus,<sup>3</sup> where we find a doctrine on the intellect which is slightly different from that set out in our Greek text. (VIII) More recently, H. J. Blumenthal has observed that the *in De Anima* III contains numerous named references to earlier commentators, in contrast to the *De Intellectu* and the *in De Anima* I–II. The only exception he accepts is Alexander of Aphrodisias. He takes this as an argument in favour of Stephanus' authorship.<sup>4</sup>

\* An infant version of this paper was delivered in May 1990 at King's College London and I am indebted to Andrew Coles, Eric Lewis and, last but not least, Richard Sorabji for the improvements they suggested. The enlarged and emended version was read by Anne Sheppard, Henry Blumenthal, William Charlton, Carlos Steel and the anonymous referee, whose remarks, corrections and doubts were of greatest help to me. I am grateful to William Charlton, again, and the Editors for correcting my rough English. For all the shortcomings, of course, I remain responsible.

<sup>1</sup> Mentioned in *CAG* xviii/3, p. v.: εἰς τὸ περὶ ψυχῆς στέφανος... (emphasized by M. Hayduck), and see H. Usener, 'De Stephano Alexandrino', in his *Kleine Schriften*. Bd. iii (Leipzig, 1914), pp. 247–323, esp. p. 284.

<sup>2</sup> In *CAG* xv, p. v.

<sup>3</sup> This work was edited first by M. de Corte, *Le commentaire de Jean Philopon sur le Troisième Livre du 'Traité de l'Ame' d'Aristote* (Liège, 1934), and more recently by G. Verbeke, *Jean Philopon. Commentaire sur le De Anima d'Aristote. Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke. Édition critique avec une introduction sur la psychologie de Philopon* (Louvain/Paris, 1966). The text, with the emendations of F. Bossier, has been translated into English by W. Charlton in *Philoponus, On Aristotle on the Intellect* (London, 1991). The fragments of the Greek version of the *De Intellectu* have been collected and edited by S. van Riet, 'Fragments de l'original grec du "De Intellectu" de Philopon dans une compilation de Sophonias', *RPhL* 63 (1967), 5–40.

<sup>4</sup> In his 'John Philoponus and Stephanus of Alexandria: Two Neoplatonist Christian Commentators on Aristotle?', in D. J. O'Meara (ed.), *Neoplatonism and Christian Thought*

Although M. Hayduck formulated his ideas with great reservation, writing that concerning this issue he could not say anything with certainty,<sup>5</sup> and G. Verbeke also handles the problem with such caution that in the introduction to his edition of the *De Intellectu* he does not deal with it, the authorship of Stephanus has become widely accepted.<sup>6</sup>

These proofs, however, are worth investigating more closely. Let us take them one by one.

I. We have, then, an adscript in a twelfth-century codex saying βιβλίον τρίτον ἀπὸ φωνῆς στεφάνου ('third book from the voice of Stephanus'). What is interesting in this clause is the expression ἀπὸ φωνῆς. What does it mean? The usage of this phrase takes its origin in the high-schools of Athens, Alexandria and Gaza. It appears for the first time in Marinus, the successor and biographer of Proclus, and in Ammonius son of Hermeias. This latter, as we know, did not write down his works, but these were recorded and edited by his disciples, among others by Philoponus, and in this context ἀπὸ φωνῆς Ἀμμοῦνίου means 'according to Ammonius' oral teaching'. This edition may either have been compiled on the basis of stenographic texts made by pupils or, more likely, simply be a reproduction of the master's thoughts. We meet the same in Olympiodorus too, and in this case also it is not the author's own text that we have but notes on his lectures. The same can be observed in Procopius of Gaza, a Christian rhetor of the sixth century, and up to the eighth century we can reckon on this meaning, with the restriction that the immediate contact between disciple and master, editor and author, which had been connected with the oral teaching, was slowly getting lost, with a corresponding diminution in reliability. From the ninth century onwards, however, education in high-schools became intermittent and thus ἀπὸ φωνῆς lost its original meaning and tended to signify simply the author; for example, ἀπὸ φωνῆς Σιμπλικίου began to mean Σιμπλικίου. What follows from it for our clause? Since it appeared as adscript in a twelfth-century manuscript it was obviously written in that century or later. But regarding the likely meaning of ἀπὸ φωνῆς in that age, the author of the adscript could not be relying on a continuous tradition. If he had rested on such a tradition, the copyists of the other codices also would have had to be aware of this fact. Besides the authoritative *Codex Parisinus gr.* 1914, we have still three

(Albany, 1982), pp. 54–66, 244–6. His other arguments which concern (1) the scale of the commentaries and (2) the organization of the material are roughly identical with III–IV proposed by Hayduck.

<sup>5</sup> 'verum tamen concedo certam ex his rebus de illo scriptore coniecturam capi non posse', *CAG* xv, p. v.

<sup>6</sup> R. Vancourt, *Les derniers commentateurs Alexandrins d'Aristote. L'école d'Olympiodore. Étienne d'Alexandrie* (Lille, 1941), p. 11; L. G. Westerink, *Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy* (Amsterdam, 1962), pp. xxiv–xxv, newly published in R. Sorabji (ed.), *Aristotle Transformed* (London, 1990), pp. 325–49, esp. 340–1; H. J. Blumenthal, 'Neoplatonic Elements in the *de Anima* Commentaries', *Phronesis* 31 (1976), 64–87, esp. p. 72 n. 37, reprinted in R. Sorabji (ed.), op. cit., pp. 305–25.; R. B. Todd, 'Themistius and the Traditional Interpretation of Aristotle's Theory of Phantasia', *Acta Classica* 24 (1981), 49–59.; G. Watson, *Phantasia in Classical Thought* (Galway, 1988), p. 129. Against this assumption see W. Bernard, 'Philoponus on Self-Awareness', in R. Sorabji (ed.), *Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science* (London, 1986), pp. 154–64, esp. pp. 154–5 n. 3. According to R. Beutler, 'Plutarchos von Athen', *RE* 21 (1951), cols. 962–75, esp. 967–8, the third book is a 'Kollegnachschrift' on one of Ammonius' lectures. The latest verdict is that of W. Charlton (op. cit., pp. 6–12) who definitely denies Philoponus' authorship but seems to hesitate in accepting that of Stephanus.

<sup>7</sup> For a detailed survey see M. Richard, 'Ἀπὸ φωνῆς', *Byzantion* 20 (1950), 191–22, and, particularly on the Alexandrian commentators, L. Tarán, 'Amicus Plato sed magis amica veritas. From Plato and Aristotle to Cervantes', *A&A* 30 (1984), 93–126, esp. pp. 103–5.

important manuscripts – *Codex Ambrosianus* L 106 (fourteenth century), *Codex Vaticanus gr.* 268 (eleventh century) and *Codex Palatinus* 281 (eleventh century), – and the excerpts of Psellus, and none of them mentions the name of Stephanus. Consequently, the first argument seems insufficient to prove Stephanus' authorship.

II. The clause cited by Hayduck, *ὡς ἐν τῷ Περὶ ἐρμηνείας ἐμάθομεν* (543.9), was taken to be a direct reference to Stephanus' *in De Interpretatione*. First of all, the phrase *ἐν τῷ Περὶ ἐρμηνείας* can hardly refer to a commentary or lecture on *De Interpretatione* but only to the *De Interpretatione* itself.<sup>8</sup> Furthermore, it may be worth observing the broader context of this reference too. The passage in 543.4–9 runs as follows:

λέγεται γὰρ ἀδιαίρετον ὁ ὅρος. ἴσμεν γὰρ ὅτι ἡ πρότασις δύο ὅρους ἔχει τὸν ὑποκείμενον καὶ τὸν κατηγορούμενον, οἷόν ἐστι πρότασις Πλάτων περιπατεῖ, καὶ Πλάτων ὅρος ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ περιπατεῖ ὅρος, καὶ ἀπλῶς ὅρος ἐστίν, ὡς ἐν τῷ Περὶ ἐρμηνείας ἐμάθομεν, ἡ ἀπλὴ φωνή.

The term is said to be indivisible, since we know that the premiss has two terms, the subject and the predicate, as e.g. 'Plato walks' is a premiss, 'Plato' is a term and 'walks' is also a term, and, as we learnt in the *De Interpretatione*, the *simplex* sound is a term *simpliciter*.

First, it has to be noticed that the expression *ἀπλὴ φωνή* does not occur in Aristotle's text at all, but it can indeed be found in Stephanus' commentary.<sup>9</sup> Nevertheless, he is not the sole commentator to use this phrase to elucidate Aristotle's notion. In Ammonius' *in De Interpretatione* we can find it many times,<sup>10</sup> and once we are told (10.17–18) that before Aristotle it was Plato who, in the ninth book of the *Laws*, called the *simplex* sounds terms. Ammonius was teaching from memory, it seems. It is well known, however, that Philoponus was not only fully conversant with the works of Ammonius but was also one of their editors. He may well have been the editor of this commentary on *De Interpretatione*.<sup>11</sup> Accordingly, if the clause refers to anything at all, though its reference could be to the text of Stephanus it could also be to that of Ammonius, of which the editor may have been Philoponus.<sup>12</sup> In addition to that, the term *simplices voces* recurs in the *De Intellectu* (68.44–5) where at 67.17–68.41 the whole issue was discussed with repetitions and in a rather propaedeutic way. Therefore, the most we can say on this phrase is that its use had been derived from the 'school of Ammonius'.

III. The third book, says Hayduck, is more compact than the first two. This seems to be a rather loose and unfounded statement. We do not need to search far for detailed expositions and self-repetitions in the text.<sup>13</sup> Stephanus' *in De Interpretatione* is far more sketchy (68 pages on about 8 Bekker-pages of Aristotle) than the *in De Anima III* (141 pages on about 10 Bekker-pages), and does not contain doxographies,

<sup>8</sup> The commentators were tempted to use the words *σχόλιον*, *σχολή* (*scholais*), *ὑπόμνημα* or *ἐν τοῖς* (*sc. ὑπομνήμασιν*) *εἰς*... to indicate that the work referred to is a commentary. In his *in De Anima I–II* Philoponus uses *ὑπόμνημα* to refer to the commentary of Alexander of Aphrodisias (21.23; 118.28); and the author of the *in De Anima III* uses it of the commentaries of Alexander (464.20–1) and Plutarch of Athens (531.25; 575.7); and Stephanus in his *in De Interpretatione* uses it to refer to Porphyry's *in De Interpretatione* (CAG xviii/3, 63.9–10).

<sup>9</sup> CAG xviii/3, 8.30–9.6.

<sup>10</sup> CAG iv/5, 2.4; 4.6–19; 9.30–10.6; 10.18; 31.3.

<sup>11</sup> See A. Busse's *supplementum praefationis* to CAG iv/5, pp. xv–xviii.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. H. D. Saffrey, 'Le chrétien Jean Philopon et la survivance de l'école d'Alexandrie au VI<sup>e</sup> siècle', *REG* 67 (1954), 396–410. His view is objected by K. Verrycken, 'The Development of Philoponus' Thought and its Chronology', in R. Sorabji (ed.), *Aristotle Transformed*, pp. 233–75, esp. pp. 238–9.

<sup>13</sup> E.g. 462.24–467.24; 477.21–487.7; 534.19–539.39; 543.21–547.24.

in contrast to the *in De Anima* III. Besides, if one takes a look at the scale of the first two books of Philoponus' *in De Anima* one will find that the first one is of 202 pages (on about 10 Bekker-pages) and the second is of 243 pages (on about 13 Bekker-pages). For this reason, then, if we compare the relative length of the books of the *in De Anima*, we may note that even if the third book is still much shorter than the *in De Anima* I–II it nevertheless stands in this respect closer to the two preceding books than to the extremely brief *in De Interpretatione*.<sup>14</sup>

IV. The third book is divided into lectures while the first two are not. This may be true,<sup>15</sup> but it was an accepted literary genre or style of the school tradition in that age to divide texts in this way.<sup>16</sup> It is characteristic not only of Stephanus but of other commentators as well, e.g. of Olympiodorus. In some of the commentaries attributed to Ammonius there are hints at divisions of this kind too.<sup>17</sup> Secondly, it is important to bear in mind, before going into subtle structural analysis, that Stephanus' *in De Interpretatione* is also an ἀπὸ φωνῆς work, that is it was written down by a disciple (or disciples) and not by Stephanus himself. Thus it may happen that after having analysed the structure of this work, what we will know is the style of the disciple rather than that of the master himself. This sort of division may have served quite well as an ordering principle for the disciples. It is not a mere accident that the works of Olympiodorus are also ἀπὸ φωνῆς ones, since we know that all of his commentaries are nothing but notes of his students.<sup>18</sup> This procedure bears closely upon the teaching activity in the Neoplatonic schools, and can be already traced in Proclus.<sup>19</sup> It therefore evidently cannot be regarded as the distinctive mark of Stephanus' works. Moreover, if L. G. Westerink is right in saying that, in the course of the development of this division, the heading and the fixed formula denoting the end of the general part or of the whole lecture are used only from the time of Olympiodorus onwards,<sup>20</sup> then the dating of the *in De Anima* III will be put in a new light. For, though it is true that in the *De Anima* III we meet the division into θεωρίαι and πράξεις, the text has no headings at all: if therefore the use of headings was introduced by the school of Olympiodorus, we may have a *terminus ante quem* for dating the work. Although it does not follow from Westerink's remarks that all commentaries after the time of Olympiodorus must have used headings, still from the fact that such formulas recur abundantly in Stephanus' *in De Interpretatione* we can suspect that these would almost certainly have been used in his other works too, including his supposed *in De Anima*. This guess may be reinforced if we notice that all the surviving commentaries written by Olympiodorus and his successors are structured in this way. This date excludes the possibility of Stephanus' authorship.

In addition to that, although this is slight evidence, it may be mentioned that the systematization of Stephanus' *in De Interpretatione* is rigorous. That is, there is one phrase dividing the commentary: "πράξεις σὺν θεῷ γ", "πράξεις δ'" etc., appears on

<sup>14</sup> Compare the vast commentary of Ammonius (*CAG* iv/5).

<sup>15</sup> The occurrence of λέξεις (36.6; 80.17; 87.30; 227.5; 230.6, 7, 8; 296.8) and θεωρία (302.19) in the first two books may be indicative of faint traces of this division.

<sup>16</sup> See A. J. Festugière, 'Modes de composition des Commentaires de Proclus', *MH* 20 (1963), 77–100, esp. pp. 77–80.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. his *in De Interpretatione* (*CAG* iv/5).

<sup>18</sup> According to L. G. Westerink, *The Greek Commentaries on Plato's Phaedo* (Amsterdam/Oxford/New York, 1976), i.20, 'His extant work consists entirely of lecture notes by students'.

<sup>19</sup> As pointed out by A. J. Festugière, op. cit., *passim*.

<sup>20</sup> L. G. Westerink, 'Philosophy and Medicine in Late Antiquity', *Janus* 51 (1964), 161–77, reprinted in his *Texts and Studies in Neoplatonism and Byzantine Literature* (Amsterdam, 1980), 83–99, esp. p. 85. However he holds, it seems inconsistently, that the *in De Anima* III is by Stephanus (p. 88).

about every second page. In the *in De Anima III* on the other hand, its occurrence is more scarce and irregular. It may be strange, indeed, that this sort of division starts in the third book. But to concede that the commentary is not homogeneous does not compel us to accept that the author of this book was Stephanus. This text may have been written by Philoponus too, or by one of his immediate disciples, though not at the same time as the preceding two books.

V. Hayduck explains neither here nor elsewhere what sort of locutions he was thinking of. For this reason, this argument seems hollow.

VI. We have evidence that Stephanus wrote a commentary on the *De Anima*.<sup>21</sup> Must we suppose that the *in De Anima III* is that commentary? Surely not. The list in *Cod. Vaticanus gr.* 241 fol. 6 is not complete and also suspect. It does not speak about, among others, Alexander's commentaries on the *Analytics*, Simplicius' *in De Caelo* and the commentaries of Syrianus and Asclepius on the *Metaphysics*. And there is another list, presumably also incomplete, which does not make any mention of Stephanus' commentary on *De Anima*.<sup>22</sup> Of course, since such lists are lacunose, that does not prove either that Stephanus did not write a commentary on the *De Anima* at all.

VII. As for Philoponus' *De Intellectu*, there is, I think, no difficulty in supposing that Philoponus wrote and held lectures on this crucial text many times.<sup>23</sup> The *in De Anima III* might be nothing other than the detailed lecture notes of a disciple or disciples. Its structure is quite compatible with this assumption.<sup>24</sup> As to the apparent fact that Philoponus left unremarked and unexplained the differences between these works, there are at least two, admittedly speculative, answers: It may be (1) that he did not leave them unexplained, but that the related texts have not survived; or (2) that our demands on the consistency of the philosopher's oeuvre are unrealistically high. Although the similarities and discrepancies between the *De Intellectu* and the *in De Anima III* need to be investigated more thoroughly,<sup>25</sup> it can at least be said that the theories of knowledge described in the *De Intellectu* and in the *in De Anima III* are in accordance with each other.<sup>26</sup> Particularly the views of the role *sensus communis* plays in the process of knowing seem to converge. In both works strong emphasis is

<sup>21</sup> Cited by M. Hayduck in *CAG* xviii/3, p. v.

<sup>22</sup> Cited by P. Wendland in his *Addamentum IV* to the edition of Alexander's *in De Sensu*, *CAG* iii/1, p. xviii.

<sup>23</sup> It has been pointed out by W. Bernard, 'Philoponus on Self-Awareness', in R. Sorabji (ed.), *op. cit.*, n. 3, as well as by O. Schissel von Fleschenberg, 'Kann die *Expositio in libros de anima* des S. Thomas Aquinas ein Kommentar des Johannes Philoponos zu Aristoteles' *Περὶ ψυχῆς* sein?', *Byzantinisch-Neugriechische Jahrbücher* 9 (1932), 104–10, esp. pp. 108–10, with reference to M. Grabmann, 'Mittelalterliche lateinische Übersetzungen von Schriften der Aristoteles-Kommentatoren Johannes Philoponos, Alexander von Aphrodisias und Themistios', *Sitzungsberichte der Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften*, Philos.-hist. Abteilung 1929, Heft 7. Moreover, M. de Corte, in the *Preface* to his edition of this text, rightly maintains (pp. xi–xv) that this Latin text cannot be the translation of the *in De Anima III*.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. R. Vancourt, *op. cit.*, *passim*. and R. Beutler, *op. cit.*, cols. 967–8.

<sup>25</sup> Some striking similarities have been pointed out by R. Vancourt (*op. cit.*, pp. 49–59), who thought that Stephanus had made use of Philoponus' commentary or that Ammonius had served as the common source for both Stephanus and Philoponus. For this assumption, see W. Charlton's remarks, *op. cit.*, pp. 6–12. Some important doctrinal discrepancies between these two works are indicated by H. J. Blumenthal, 'John Philoponus and Stephanus of Alexandria: Two neoplatonist Christian Commentators of Aristotle?', in D. J. O'Meara (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 54–66, esp. pp. 56ff., and W. Charlton, *op. cit.*, pp. 9–12.

<sup>26</sup> Let it suffice to mention the *in De Anima III* 519.8–12: ὁ γὰρ δυνάμει νοῦς πάντων ἔχει τὴν νόησιν [*sc. ἐν ἡμῖν*]... ἐν εἰκόνι, comparing *De Intellectu* 83.42–8: 'rationes omnium insunt in anima...eikonice'.

laid on its function of discerning the heterogeneous perceptibles, and *sensus communis* is treated as the terminating point (*ἀποπεράτωσις* 555.7, 25; *terminus* 100.96–7) which is one in subject but many in account (*λόγῳ*, *ratione*). As a single point it is one but as the terminating point of many particular senses it is supposed to be many.<sup>27</sup>

VIII. It seems that, the argument concerning the difference of scholarly practices in the *in De Anima I–II* and *III* is not decisive. One could add another exception, namely Themistius, whose views on touch and tactile perception were examined and criticized at length by Philoponus in *in De Anima II* 407.18–419.2. On the other hand, if Stephanus was so committed to thorough investigations of his predecessors' oeuvre, why do we *not* find any sign of this attitude in his *in De Interpretatione* as well? Of course, the difference in presentation of materials between the *De Intellectu* and the *in De Anima III* cannot be neglected but this fact need not entail that the author of the *in De Anima III* was Stephanus.

In the second part of the paper I should like to bring forward some indications that may strengthen the suspicion that the author of *in De Anima III* is not Stephanus.

## I

In this book there are two important doxographies, the one concerning the active intellect (*νοῦς ποιητικός*), the other on how we are aware that we are perceiving.

### (1) *The active intellect*

In his long report on the theories on the role and functioning of active intellect (534.19–539.39) the author sets out the opinions of the philosophers, of whom the latest is Marinus, the disciple, biographer and successor of Proclus. We know that Proclus died in 485. Philoponus' dates are *c.* 490–*c.* 570, and Stephanus' *floruit* is around 610, when he was invited to Constantinople.<sup>28</sup> If the author of this doxography is Stephanus, why didn't he make any mention of Simplicius (or Priscianus; this depends on who is the author of the work in *CAG xi*) whose doctrine on the active intellect would have been worth taking into consideration? Philoponus could not have done so because Simplicius and Priscianus flourished after he had given up his strictly philosophical activity and had devoted himself to Christian theology,<sup>29</sup> but he could mention the name of Marinus who lived one or two generations before him. Thanks to the contacts between the philosophical schools of Athens and Alexandria in the fifth and the early sixth centuries, Philoponus could be well versed in Marinus' works. The remaining question is whether Stephanus was at all familiar with the commentaries of Simplicius and his associates, who probably wrote them in Persia and in Harrân (Carrhae),<sup>30</sup> since this town was too far from the

<sup>27</sup> For the whole account see *De Intellectu* 100.87–104.92 and *in De Anima III* 455.12–456.11; 477.21–483.11; 555.3–8, 35–9 respectively.

<sup>28</sup> See the chronology given by R. Sorabji in *Aristotle Transformed*, pp. 29–30.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. K. Verrycken, art. cit. (n. 12).

<sup>30</sup> This view was proposed by I. Hadot, 'La vie et l'œuvre de Simplicius d'après des sources grecques et arabes', in I. Hadot (ed.), *Simplicius – sa vie, son œuvre, sa survie* (Peripatoi 15) (Berlin/New York, 1987), 3–39, translated into English in R. Sorabji (ed.), op. cit., pp. 275–305, with reference to M. Tardieu, 'Sâbiens coraniques et "Sâbiens" de Harrân', *Journal Asiatique* 274 (1986), 1–44, and id., 'Les calendriers en usage à Harrân d'après les sources arabes et le commentaire de Simplicius à la *Physique* d'Aristote', in I. Hadot (ed.), op. cit., pp. 40–57. Tardieu's assumption has been rejected by S. van Riet, 'A propos de la biographie de Simplicius' *RPhL* 89 (1991), 506–14. The view that Simplicius returned to Athens was revived by

cultural centres of the Hellenic world. Having in mind, however, the close contacts between this cultural and commercial centre, located on the Byzantine-Persian border, and the other cities of the Byzantine Empire,<sup>31</sup> there is no reason why Simplicius' commentaries should not have reached Constantinople or Alexandria.

## (2) Perception awareness

In the other doxography (462.26–467.12) the author names two philosophers, Alexander of Aphrodisias and Plutarch of Athens, and makes mention of a group or school that thinks that it is by virtue of the attentive (*προσεκτικόν*) part of the soul that we are aware that we are perceiving. In this way they postulate a sixth part of the rational soul and this doctrine is, as our author maintains, without antecedents. We do not find any allusion to this theory in Simplicius or Priscianus Lydus, not to speak of Stephanus' in *De Interpretatione* or the works of Stephanus of Athens. Who, then, were these *νεώτεροι*, more recent philosophers? There is no need to date them later than Philoponus. Surely, one of them was Damascius, the contemporary of Ammonius son of Hermias. In his commentary on Plato's *Phaedo* he applies the same terminology in the same context.<sup>32</sup> Since Damascius studied rhetoric in Alexandria, and later, as a leading figure among Athenian Neoplatonists, visited the Alexandrian philosophers many times,<sup>33</sup> his doctrines had to be known to Philoponus too, who thus could refer to these views as up-to-date ones.

## II

We have a piece of evidence suggesting that the author of the first two books and that of the third may be identical. This is doctrinal evidence concerning the explanation of perception. Both in the *in De Anima I–II* and in the *in De Anima III* we are told

A. Cameron, 'The Last Days of the Academy of Athens', *PCPhS* n.s. 15 (1969), 7–29, and criticized by H. J. Blumenthal, '529 and its Sequel: What Happened to the Academy?', *Byzantion* 48 (1978), 369–85. Previously, P. Tannery, 'Sur la période finale de la philosophie grecque', *Revue philosophique* 42 (1896), 266–87 also suggested (pp. 285–6) that Simplicius, Damascius and their associates had never returned to Athens.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. I. Hadot, 'La vie et l'œuvre de Simplicius d'après des sources grecques et arabes', in I. Hadot (ed.), op. cit., pp. 3–39.

<sup>32</sup> i.269.5, 271.3; ii.19.5, 21.3. Westerink, published as Vol. ii of *The Greek Commentaries on Plato's Phaedo* (Amsterdam/Oxford/New York, 1977). The editor refers to Proclus (pp. 162–3) as the possible predecessor of this theory. Missing from Proclus' text (*in Parmenidem* 957.28–958.11 Cousin) are (1) the term itself and (2) any hint at a separate faculty of the rational soul whose task is to be aware of perceiving, desiring and other mental activities. It might be more appropriate to point to the excerpts from Proclus' in *Ennead* preserved in Psellus' *Περὶ ἀρχῶν καὶ ἐνώσεως ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος*, published in Michael Psellus, *Philosophica Minora*, ii, ed. D. J. O'Meara (Leipzig, 1989), pp. 72–5. An explanation of *προσεκτικόν μέρος* is to be found in this commentary preserved also by Psellus in his *De Omnifaria Doctrina*, ed. L. G. Westerink (Nijmegen/Utrecht, 1948), ch. 63: *προσοχή δὲ ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν προσέχομεν τοῖς ἔργοις οἷς πράττομεν καὶ τοῖς λόγοις οἷς λέγομεν. αὕτη γὰρ ποτὲ μὲν τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡθὴ ἀνασκοπεῖται τίνα τέ ἐστιν καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς ἄλλα, ποτὲ δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ ζῶον θεωρεῖ τί πράττει καὶ πῇ παραβαίνει καὶ τί ἐλλείπεται*. Cf. L. G. Westerink, 'Excerpte aus Proklos' *Enneaden-Kommentar bei Psellos*', *BZ* 52 (1959), 1–10, reprinted in his *Texts and Studies*..., 21–31. Psellus himself also refers to the 'right explanation' of this faculty in his *Συλλογαὶ διάφοραι καὶ ποικίλαι*, ed. D. J. O'Meara in the edition cited above, pp. 63.5–8.

<sup>33</sup> See L. G. Westerink (ed.), *The Greek Commentaries on Plato's Phaedo*, ii.8–9., L. G. Westerink and J. Combès (eds.), *Damascius. Traité des premiers principes*, i (Paris, 1986), pp. xii–xiii. In general, there was a constant exchange of students and professors between the two schools, as A. C. Lloyd has pointed out in A. H. Armstrong (ed.), *Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Mediaeval Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1967), p. 316.

that the sensing organ is in a way immaterial. The common sensing organ for the senses is the *pneuma* or the *pneumatic body* and this is the αἰσθητικὴ δύναμις ‘sensing faculty’) of the senses.<sup>34</sup> The author of the *in De Anima* III presents it as *his own* theory in 481.20–2 that the forms of perceptibles come into being in the *pneumatic body* and it is the *sensus communis* (κοινὴ αἴσθησις) whose task it is to judge and discriminate these affections or impressions (πάθη) in the *pneuma*. We meet the same terms at 52.4–6 in the *in De Anima* I, held to be the genuine work of Philoponus.

### III

In the third book we read a doctrine that reminds us of that of the pre-existence of the soul (541.20–542.5).<sup>35</sup> Of course, this view is of Platonic, if not Pythagorean, origin but it is important to remember that by Philoponus’ time, and even before, it had become well-known to the Christian theologians as well. It was Origen who adopted this doctrine into Christian theology. He lived at Alexandria for a long time, and was one of the most renowned and celebrated authors in the Eastern Church. There may be no absurdity in supposing that the Neoplatonist philosophers of this city also were well-read in his teaching.<sup>36</sup> Philoponus, as a good Christian and as a good Neoplatonist as well, had every reason to accept this theory without any reservation. To say the same of Stephanus, however, seems to be hardly possible. The reason is that in 543 the Emperor Justinian I condemned Origen and his followers in an Edict containing fifteen anathemas on nine of his tenets, including that of the preexistence of soul. The condemnation was signed by the Pope and all the patriarchs. And what is more important, ten years later Origenism was rejected again by the Fifth Ecumenical Council held in Constantinople in 553. It may be due to these anathemas that the bulk of these authors’ writings has not survived in Greek but in translations only. Can it be supposed that Stephanus, who was appointed οἰκουμενικὸς διδάσκαλος καὶ φιλόσοφος, i.e. professor or perhaps rector at the Imperial Academy in Constantinople, would have been permitted to preach a doctrine of this sort? The author of the *in De Anima* III takes over this theory without any critique or modification. Knowing the tolerance of the Eastern Church, it seems to be excluded that a philosopher, especially in Constantinople, could teach doctrines considered heretical, and it is also improbable that a philosopher teaching heresy could be called to the capital of the Empire and nominated professor at that Academy.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>34</sup> 158.8–34; 161.19–21; 201.31; 433.32; 482.11–13.

<sup>35</sup> The word for ‘preexistence’ (προϋπαρξίς) does not occur in the text but the phrase ἄλλος βίος may allude to this, and the statement that the soul may have a certain innate knowledge (520.1–12) may bear on this theory. For the προϋπαρξίς of soul in the late Alexandrian Neoplatonists, see Olympiodorus’ *in Phaedonem* 13.7.2–3 Westerink.

<sup>36</sup> This affinity was noticed by E. Evrard, ‘Les convictions religieuses de Jean Philopon et la date de son commentaire aux *Météorologiques*’, *Bulletin de l’Académie Royale de Belgique*, Classe des lettres et sciences politiques et morales, sér. 5.39 (1953), 299–357, referring (p. 350) to 241.27–8; 242.16–19. For the similarities in their exegetical principles see I. Hadot, ‘Les introductions aux commentaires exégétiques chez les auteurs néoplatoniciens et les auteurs chrétiens’, in M. Tardieu (ed.), *Les règles de l’interprétation* (Paris, 1987), pp. 99–122.

<sup>37</sup> Philoponus had never made it up with Chalcedon and the Council of Constantinople of 553, as his theological works witness. For his theological activity cf. H. Chadwick, ‘Philoponus the Christian Theologian’, in R. Sorabji (ed.), *Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science*, pp. 41–57. Regarding Stephanus’ loyalty, on the other hand, H. Usener (op. cit., pp. 257ff.) calls attention to his apologetic writings against the Muslims.



## IV

In the *in De anima III* 457.24–5 we find a reference to the author's mathematical work. The text runs as follows:

σκοπεί ὅτι ἀντιδιέσπειλε τῷ ἀριθμῷ τὸ ἓν. οὐδὲ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ μονὰς ἀριθμὸς, ὡς ἀποδέδεικται ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμητικοῖς λόγοις.

Bear in mind that he [sc. Aristotle] contrasted the one with number, for the monad is not a number, as was demonstrated in the treatise on arithmetic.

In this sentence, no doubt, the author refers to a work dealing with arithmetic. Now, Philoponus wrote a commentary on Nicomachus' *Introductio Arithmeticae*, and what is more, in this commentary he makes an identical assertion, and also gives a reason for it by saying that the monad is not a number but the principle of number and as such has to be different from number, since a principle is different from that of which it is the principle.<sup>38</sup> There need be no difficulty in admitting that ἀποδέδεικται in 457.25 refers to these remarks. Furthermore, the thesis is reaffirmed in Philoponus' commentary on the *Categories*.<sup>39</sup> As for Stephanus, however, while it is known that he was interested in astronomy and astrology,<sup>40</sup> there is no trace of an inquiry by him into arithmetical matters, or commentaries on arithmetical treatises,<sup>41</sup> including Nicomachus' *Introductio*.<sup>42</sup> Moreover, in his writings concerning astrology or alchemy he does not speak of arithmetic at all, and the content of these studies is far from being arithmetical.<sup>43</sup>

## V

Some references in the *in De Anima III* show that the author alludes to the commentaries of Philoponus and/or Ammonius without feeling any obligation to specify that it is the work of Philoponus and/or Ammonius that he is speaking of.<sup>44</sup> The fact that these theories or remarks are not found in Aristotle and presumably were invented by Philoponus or Ammonius may suggest that the author of the *in De Anima III* was in such close contact with Philoponus and/or Ammonius that,

<sup>38</sup> Cf. his *in Nicom. II* xviii/1.9–10: οὐδέτερον δὲ τούτων (sc. μονὰς καὶ δυνάς) ἀριθμὸς, ὡς πολλάκις ἐδείξαμεν, ἀλλ' ἀρχαὶ ἀριθμῶν. ἡ δὲ ἀρχὴ ἑτερόν ἐστιν, οὐ ἐστὶν ἀρχή. Cf. also *in Nicom. II* i.1.30; i.2.5–6; *in Nicom. I* ii.5.7; iii.5.2; viii.1.1–2, 10–15; xi.1.20–1; xvii.4.3–4; xxi.3.4–5. All references are taken from the edition of R. Hoche, i (Leipzig, 1864–5), ii (Berlin, 1867). It is worth mentioning that Nicomachus never explicitly states this difference. Defining number (*Introductio Arithmeticae* i.7.1 Hoche), he sketches out three possible definitions without explanation. For this reason the ἀποδέδεικται in *in De Anima III* 457.25 cannot refer to the *Introductio* itself.

<sup>39</sup> *In Cat.* 46.19–20: καὶ ἡ μονὰς ἀρχὴ ἀριθμοῦ, ἀριθμὸς δὲ οὐδαμῶς.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. the work entitled *Διασάφεις ἐξ οἰκείων ὑποδειγμάτων τῆς τῶν προχείρων κανόνων ἐφόδου τοῦ Θεώνος*, ed. H. Usener, op. cit., pp. 295ff. Furthermore, we know the Syriac version of his *De differentia, numero ac divisione* in *Opuscula monophysitica Ioannis Philoponi*, ed. et latine interpretatus est A. Šanda (Beirut, 1930), which deals with arithmetic and theology *more Pythagorico*, and Christology.

<sup>41</sup> In the *Cod. Marc.* gr. 335 under Stephanus' name there is a treatise entitled *Περὶ τῆς μαθηματικῆς τέχνης*, though its subject is not arithmetical but astrological.

<sup>42</sup> The so-called Recension IV of the *in Nicom.* is held by P. Tannery, *Mémoires scientifiques*, ii (Toulouse/Paris, 1912), pp. 302–10 and L. Tarán, 'Asclepius of Tralles. Commentary to Nicomachus' *Introduction to Arithmetic*', *TAPhS* n.s. 59, part 4 (Philadelphia, 1969), p. 20, to be not by Stephanus because the θεωρία – λέξεις division is missing here.

<sup>43</sup> Ed. H. Usener, op. cit., pp. 267–332.

<sup>44</sup> E.g. 458.25–6, cf. Philoponus, *in Cat.* 151.13–19; 481.27–9, cf. Ammonius, *in De Int.* 254.32–255.6; 571.17–18 cf. Philoponus, *in Cat.* 114.17–19. In 528.35 we read: ἄλλο ἐστὶ τὸ τῷδε καὶ τὸ τῷδε. This philosophical distinction between nominative and dative forms of a word occurs in Philoponus, *in De Anima I*, 34.20–3 too.

discussing these problems, he felt it unnecessary to mention it or to name them as possible authors. Because of the great difference in time between them, it would have been hard for Stephanus to do this. And indeed, in his *in De Interpretatione* he often mentions Ammonius, 'our teacher', as one who suggested new solutions to particular problems.<sup>45</sup>

### CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the enumerated items of evidence are perhaps sufficient to establish that Stephanus cannot be the author of the *in De Anima III*, and that this work was written in the very first decades of the sixth century by Philoponus or was recorded by one of his disciples on the basis of his lectures. This latter possibility would be reinforced by the divisions, and therefore seems more probable. Apart from these points, though it is true that the *in De Anima* is not a single homogeneous work, and that the third book has some peculiarities of its own and even some odd internal inconsistencies,<sup>46</sup> which have up to the present day been generally neglected, this is not sufficient to prove that the author of the *in De Anima III* is Stephanus. It is quite possible that Philoponus returned to this crucial treatise many times and that pieces of his commentaries were coupled and shaped by later editors. Nevertheless, the divisions may indicate that we are dealing with a text recorded by one of Philoponus' disciples, and it seems to be Philoponus' thoughts that are represented in the *in De Anima III*.

### APPENDIX

Recently, in a scholarly study, W. Wolska-Conus has undertaken to show that the Stephani mentioned by early Byzantine sources are one and the same person.<sup>47</sup> Although it is beyond the scope of my paper to examine thoroughly and evaluate the whole study,<sup>48</sup> nevertheless it seems necessary to scrutinize her thesis that the author of the *in De Anima III* and that of the *Commentary on Hippocrates' Prognosticon* (*Progn.*) are one and the same philosopher.<sup>49</sup> She endeavours to demonstrate this point by reference to three subjects: (1) the role of *sensus communis*, (2) the theory of locomotion, and (3) the theory of *φαντασία*.<sup>50</sup>

#### (1) *Sensus communis*

(a) Discussing *sensus communis* (477.21–482.7), the author of the *in De Anima III* applies the same formulas as Stephanus of Athens does in the *Progn.* Moreover, the procedure is also the same, namely, the author poses two possibilities for solving the problem in question, of which the one is false but the other is right.

However, this method stems partly from Aristotle himself, whose habit was to

<sup>45</sup> CAG xviii/3, 5.13; 21.38; 66.1; 67.17.

<sup>46</sup> This is suggested, among other passages, by the first *theoria* (446.5–450.34) where we are told that the *sensus communis* was discussed in the *in De Anima I–II* (446.5–447.2, esp. 446.13–15), despite the fact that it is in this book and not in the preceding ones that the problem is expounded.

<sup>47</sup> W. Wolska-Conus, 'Stéphanos d'Athènes et Stéphanos d'Alexandrie. Essai d'identification et de biographie', *REB* 47 (1989), 5–89.

<sup>48</sup> According to the reservation formulated by M. Roueché ('The Definitions of Philosophy and a New Fragment of Stephanus the Philosopher', forthcoming in *JÖB*), the method based on internal evidence and parallels of usage is not by any means appropriate in this matter. I am grateful to Dr Roueché for sending me a copy of this paper.

<sup>49</sup> References are to page and line of *Stephanus the Philosopher. Commentary on the Prognosticon of Hippocrates*, ed. and trans. J. M. Duffy, *CMG* xi.1.2 (Berlin, 1983).

<sup>50</sup> Wolska-Conus, *op. cit.* 33–47.

enumerate and confront the different views of his predecessors and contemporaries and then to present the right solution, and partly from the method of *διαίρεσις* used frequently by the Neoplatonists.<sup>51</sup> For this reason, the procedure cannot be considered distinctive of Philoponus or Stephanus.

(b) By the *ἐν ἑτέροις* (sc. *λόγοις*) in *Progn. II* 11, 160.23 Stephanus alludes to the *in De Anima III* where an examination of the *sensus communis* takes place.

It seems that this evidence is worth testing more closely. In *II* 11, 160.23–4 we read that ‘it has been shown elsewhere that the *sensus communis* works in conjunction (*συνεργούσα*) with all the particular senses’.<sup>52</sup> Stephanus, then, is talking about *συνεργεῖν* of particular senses and *sensus communis*. But this view is not exactly the same as what we find in the *in De Anima III*. Here, in 455.15, the author insists on the *συνεργεῖν* of *two particular senses* and not on that between particular senses and *sensus communis*. Because he thinks that the *sensus communis* is not one of the particular senses,<sup>53</sup> it seems highly questionable whether he could speak of *συνεργεῖν* between particular senses and *sensus communis* in the same way as he used this verb to indicate co-operation between two or more particular senses. But if so, *ἐν ἑτέροις* in *Progn. II* 11, 160.23 can in no way refer to the *in De Anima III*. For either it is one and the same author who applies one term in different meanings, and who thus, in the two commentaries, has two different accounts on this subject – and then one could ask why our author should refer back to a doctrine no longer accepted by himself –, or we are dealing with two different authors. This latter possibility may be the more plausible one.

(c) In *Progn. II* 11, 162.4–7, in the course of a philosophical investigation, there is a threefold division of soul into vegetative (or nutritive), irrational and rational parts, and this same is found in the *in De Anima III* 576.4 too.

This is quite true. But the author of the *in De Anima I–II*, that is Philoponus, also admits this familiar division.<sup>54</sup>

## (2) *Theory of locomotion*

(a) Concerning the theory of locomotion,<sup>55</sup> the author of the *in De Anima III* says that the nutritive faculty works with greater intensity at night (576.25–6) – a view found also in Stephanus’ *Commentary on Hippocrates’ Aphorisms II* 1, 140.28–40.<sup>56</sup> But this view is accepted in and common to other texts and commentaries too,<sup>57</sup> and therefore the reference to Stephanus’ work proves nothing.

<sup>51</sup> The importance of *διαίρεσις* for the Neoplatonists was most recently emphasized by A. C. Lloyd, *The Anatomy of Neoplatonism* (Oxford, 1990), pp. 11–17, 28–33.

<sup>52</sup> *ἐδείχθη ἐν ἑτέροις πάσαις ταῖς κατὰ μέρος αἰσθήσεσι συνεργούσα καὶ ἡ κοινὴ αἴσθησις*.

<sup>53</sup> See 479.3–6. Incidentally, Philoponus represents the same view in the *in De Anima II* 252.25–35.

<sup>54</sup> 5.24–6.30; 37.3–4; 205.10–11. In order to emphasize Stephanus’ steady adherence to this tripartite division, Wolska-Conus (op. cit., 38 n. 21) says that in the *De Anima* 432a–b Aristotle inclines to recognize innumerable faculties or parts of the soul. This seems to be not quite true, however, because in this passage (III 9, 432a22ff.) what Aristotle does is first to pose an *aporia*, and then present the theories of other philosophers on the number of the soul’s parts. The clause *τρόπον γὰρ τινὰ ἄπειρα φαίνεται* should be read in this methodological context.

<sup>55</sup> 576.1–581.38.

<sup>56</sup> Pagination is after *Stephanus the Philosopher. Commentary on Hippocrates’ Aphorisms*, text and trans. L. G. Westerink, i, *CMG* xi.1.3, (Berlin, 1985). The text runs as follows: *τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ὕπνου γινόμενον τῷ παντὶ σώματι χρήσιμον*. This passage has no close doctrinal affinity to the *in De Anima III* where (576.25–6) we are told that: *... μᾶλλον ἐνεργεῖ ἢ θρεπτικῇ* [sc. *δύναμις*], *ἐν νυκτὶ φημι...*

<sup>57</sup> Cf. Wolska-Conus, op. cit., 39 n.26.

(b) In a passage treating the topic of sleep, there are two levels in the *Progn.*, namely, a general, philosophical survey of the soul and its parts, and then (*II* 11, 162.22–9), after a rather incoherent and confused transition, a medical passage in which the author begins to search for the cause of sleep. The argumentation consists of considering the parts of soul one by one, and excluding whatever cannot be taken for this cause. This type of argumentation can be found in the *in De Anima III* as well.

This again is true but it is characteristic not only of Stephanus but also of other philosophers in the late Neoplatonic tradition to resolve problems in this way. Even within Philoponus' *in De Anima I–II*, one may mention the long and detailed discourse on sight (324.25–340.9).<sup>58</sup>

### (3) *Theory of φαντασία*

(a) In the *theoria* on φαντασία (506.20–512.2) we find the same procedure. Moreover (b), the etymology of φαντασία is given as φαν[θέντων] στάσις and this is what we meet also in *Progn.* 164.6–7.

But, in the *Prooemium* of Philoponus' *in De Anima* the author gives the same etymology (6.4–6).<sup>59</sup>

As an overall feature of the *in De Anima III* Mme. Wolska-Conus mentions that the author was deeply engaged in medical problems and thinks this may be an indication that the Stephanus of Alexandria who is supposed to be the author of the *in De Anima III* and Stephanus of Athens are one and same person. Although this statement could be true, Philoponus was also interested in medical matters. This is revealed not only by the *in De Anima I–II*, but also by the extant parts of his *in De Generatione et Corruptione*, and in these commentaries Philoponus shows great knowledge of medical thought and great sensitivity to its philosophical implications.<sup>60</sup> In the *in De Anima I* 89.16–17 he refers to the *ιατρικὸς λόγος* according to which it is solely or for the most part the nerves that are responsible for perception. There is an Arabic tradition that Philoponus was a doctor, though it is open to doubt.<sup>61</sup> Furthermore, to take only the examples given by Mme. Wolska-Conus, in the *in De Anima III* 501.25 the author speaks about opening the veins, just like Philoponus in the *in De Anima I* 206.7;<sup>62</sup> in 452.32–453.1 he says that every sort of digestion takes place by means of warmth, and this is the opinion of Philoponus too;<sup>63</sup> in 588.10–12 he considers the nerves the organs of the sensitive faculty, but we find the same in 19.12–15 written, in all probability, by Philoponus.<sup>64</sup> Moreover, the alleged Stephanus in the *in De Anima III* was particularly interested in the problem of sleep and dreams, just as Philoponus is in the *in De Anima I–II*.<sup>65</sup>

<sup>58</sup> Incidentally, the translation of καθ' ὁρμήν by both 'libre choix' and 'libre décision' (pp. 40–1) seems to miss the point. The ὁρμή (appetite or impulse) can by no means be regarded as a function of the rational soul, whereas 'libre décision' must be.

<sup>59</sup> As mentioned also by Wolska-Conus, op. cit., 44 n. 56.

<sup>60</sup> Cf. R. B. Todd, 'Philosophy and Medicine in John Philoponus' Commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima*', *DOP* 38 (1984), 103–11, and more generally his 'Galenic Medical Ideas in the Greek Aristotelian Commentators', *SO* 52 (1977), 117–34.

<sup>61</sup> The related literature was summarized by O. Temkin, 'Byzantine Medicine: Tradition and Empiricism', *DOP* 16 (1962), 95–115, esp. p. 105 n. 58.

<sup>62</sup> Wolska-Conus, op. cit. 46 n.68, φλεβότομος.

<sup>63</sup> Ib. n. 65: πᾶσα δὲ πέψις διὰ θερμοῦ – 288.26–7: τὸ δὲ τὴν πέψιν ἐργαζόμενον τὸ θερμόν ἐστιν; cf. 204.5; 281.26.

<sup>64</sup> Ib. n. 62. Besides, unlike Wolska-Conus, op. cit. 46, I am tempted to think that the word *χυμός* in 462.16 does not contain any reference to humoral pathology. The passage runs: *νυνὶ δὲ οὐ μόνον ἐν χρώματι θεωροῦμεν ἀριθμόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ψόφοις καὶ χυμοῖς*. Here *χυμός* means simply 'flavour', alongside *ψόφος*, 'sound', and the *χρώμα*, 'colour'.

<sup>65</sup> Ib. p. 47, cf. Philoponus' *in De Anima I–II*, 110.32; 203.23–4; 204.2–5; 216.2–8.

To sum up, the arguments advanced by Mme. Wolska-Conus are insufficient to demonstrate that the author of the *in De Anima III* and Stephanus of Athens are identical. They permit us to suppose that the author of the *in De Anima III* and that of the *in De Anima I-II* may be one and the same thinker, who was surely not Stephanus.

It remains to be said, then, that the arguments provided in favour of Stephanus' authorship of the *in De Anima III* are untenable and insufficient to establish this hypothesis. There is evidence, both theoretical and chronological, which seems to exclude this possibility. Nevertheless, it is equally true that they are not enough to establish beyond doubt that its author was Philoponus. The most plausible hypothesis is that it is thanks to a disciple of Philoponus that this work has come down to us.

*Solymár, Hungary*

PETER LAUTNER